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The Latin word "saeculum ' is of uncertain origin. According to scholars, it 
is regularly used in Classical Latin to mean "generation" "age", "a long 
period of time". In Christian usage it came to mean the world as opposed to the 
church. The Oxford English Dictionary records the use of the term "secular" 
to mean "belonging to th1. world, as distinct from the church a.nd religion; civil 
lay, temporal, chiefly with the negative sense of non-ecclesiastical, non-
religious, or non-sacred". This usage is found as early as 1290. In a secondary 
usage of the word, the clergy who did not live in an order but in the world were 
called secular. Hooker's use of the term in his Ecclesiastical Polity, 1597, is a 
good example of the Christian usage throughout the centuries until recent 
times: 'Religion and the fear of God as well induceth secular prosperitie as 
everlasting blisse in the world to come." 
A somewhat new dimension of t11e meaning and context of the concept of 
secularism emerges at the Peace of Westphalia in 1646. In this context, it 
meant the expropriation of ecclesiastical property for worldly purposes. This 
usage gradually led, a ,;entury later, to the idea that secularisation is the 
rational and natural order of things. It is important to note, however, that all 
acts of expropriation of ecclesiastical property cannot be regarded as 
secularisation in the above sense of the term: the acts of expropriation in the 
time of the Reformation, for example, were intended to renew and reactivate 
the unity of the spiritual and worldly interests while it is the increasing 
separation of the two spheres of interest that is one of the most important ideas 
in the development of the concept ofsecularisation in modem times. Stallmann 
aptly points out: "As a political concept secularisation is characteristic of the 
age in which pol.itical power became an independent worldly power, and in 
which at the same time religion was increasingly distinguished as the 'inward' 
affair of man from his 'outward' political and civi l status." 
Proceeding from this separation between the "inner" and "outer" life of 
man, which carries wifuin it fue possibility of the autonomy of each, the next 
most significant development is recorded by the Oxford English Dictionary in 
the following definition of secularism which it dates 1851: "The doctrine that 
morality should be based on regard to the well-being of mankind in the present 
life, to the exclusion of all considerations drawn from belief in God or a future 
sta.te." This definition reflects the thought of a remarkable man, George Jacob 
Holyoake, who lived from 1817 to 1906. In the next section of this 
presentation, I have attempted a systematisation of contemporary thinking on 
secularism and secular theology in terms of three different but inter-related 
theories. Holyoake's thinking in the mid-nineteenth century already contains so 
many basic ideas of all the three trends that I wish to present his ideas in brief 
before passing on to contemporary thought. 
Holyoake was attracted to the views and ideals of Robert Owen, and became 
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a lecturer in the Owenite movement. In 1841 he was the last person to be jailed 
in England for public blasphemy, and served a sentence of six months. It may 
in fact have been this experience which led him to describe his position by 
coining the neutral term "secularism ' in preference to the more dangerous term 
"atheism . 
A clear and enthusiastic account of his views is found in a volume entitled 
Christianity and Secularism (London, 1863). It contains the vebalim report of 
a public discussion which took place in January and February of that year 
between Holyoake and an Independent minister. The general question to which 
the speakers addressed themselves was: what advantages would accrue to 
mankind generally, and the working classes in particular by tl1e removal of 
Christianity, and the substitution of secularism in its place. The details of this 
debate are highly interesting but it is not possible to go into them here. 
However one must remark upon t11e prophetic significance of the terms of this 
debate which were framed so precisely more than a hundred years ago. 
Holyoake did not want to be a systembuilder. He was not interested in 
elaborating a philosophically respectable world-view to oppose and replace the 
Christian one. What he offered was simple maxims and practical guidance. He 
stated his presuppositions as follows: "We believe in relative Truth and 
discretionary Silence; in Reason as a test; in Science as a power; in Service as 
a duty; and in Endurance as a virtue." As to the existence of God he is simply 
agnostic. Morality he defmes as the "system of human duties commencing 
from man. It is contradistinguished from religion which, for Holyoake, is 
"that system of human duties assumed to commence from God." 
A secularist is defined as "one who gives primary attention to those subjects 
the issues of which can be tested by the experience of this life. The secularist 
principle requires that precedence should be given to the duties of this life over 
those which pertain to another world. 'Although for the purposes of the debate 
he insists that he is only claiming precedence for the concerns of tllis life it is 
clear from the course of the debate itself that these concerns in practice exclude 
and render unnecessary any other-worldly theistic system. He adds, "you 
cannot reform the world by a legical coup d'etat. You must be content to study 
men in groups, and meet their states of thought specially and patiently." 
The weight of his argument is til at attention to temporal things is based upon 
practical experience of 'the living interests of the hour" whereas Christianity is 
a matter of speculation. The Christianjty he wishes to displace is defined as 
"moulding human duties to suit the prospects of another life." About the use of 
the Sabbath he writes, "The precept, Keep the Sabbath-day holy', we would 
interpret into keeping it healthfully, usefully, instructively. Secularism would 
take, when necessary, the poor factory-jaded Sunday scholars into fields -
that schoolroom of Nature: It would throw open the Clyde on the Sunday to 
tbe Sunday steamer, that tile poor Glasgow weaver might gaze on Ben Lomond 
on the Lord's Day. It would give the mechanic access to museum, and 
botanical gardens, crystal palaces and even to the theatre on tllat day. We 
would do it, because one drama of Shakespeare is a nobler creation than any 
sermon which was ever preached." 
In brief, Holyoake wishes to "free the Secular sphere . .. to authorise aU 
men to walk in it without alarm of any kind, l.ike that created by .. . many parts 
of the New Testament . .. We would not pray for t11e people, after the Church 
and Dissenting manner - we should seek to help tllem. We should not send 
dogma missionaries to the heathen - we should send arts, sciences and 
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in tructors." "Leave religious dreamers to wait on supernatural aid - let us 
look to what man can do for man." " During the prevalence of a pestilence an 
hospital is of more value than a college of theologians." Against the doctrine of 
"special interpositions ' Holyoake boldly sets the world of man, guided by 
what scientific powers he is able to acquire. "Every tick and stone , he say . 
'every blade of grass, every bird and flower every penniless man woman, and 
child, has an owner in this England of ours no less than in New Orleans." 
The following quotation summarises Holyoake's views: 
The problem solved by secularism is this, that this partially comprehended 
and unexplored universe is yet, in its material and ascertainable relations to 
man a possible theatre of the limitless happiness of humanity - that the 
light of duty may be seen that a life of usefulness may be led indefinite 
refinement may be attained and tranquility in death, and U1e highest desert 
in untried existence beyond us may be won, though the Origin of all things 
shall be hidden from us, and the Revelations of every religious sect shall be 
rejected. 
The great significance of Holyoake's theory lies in its astonishing modernity, 
one might even say, its uptodateness. Already in this work of 1863, one can 
find the key ideas of both liberal positivist secularism and Marxist 
revo.lutionary secularism. Also current radica l theological secularism is 
foreshadowed by Holyoake. Indeed in his theory even in the summary form 
given here , one can already see the beginnings of a crucial ambiguity in the 
concept of secularism. On Ole one hand there is a cha llenge to Christianity to 
be central to man's life here and now to be a force in ilic world; on the other 
secularism is being presented as an alternative world-view which could , and 
should replace the Christian or indeed, any religious or metaphysical world-
view. This ambiguity persists up-to-date. In 1928 the International Missionary 
Council meeting in Jerusalem reflected this ambivalence very clearly. n was 
characteristic of the Conference that one speaker should find it possible to say 
that ' we are agreed on Ole fact of the opposition of secu lar civilisation to 
Christianity" and iliat anoilier speaker should ay that, 'in many respects 
secular civilisation is a disintere ted pursuit of human welfare." 
On the one hand Cannon Charles Raven will be necessary for us to 
accept all this rich contribution of iliis new way of life (secularism) ... Secular 
civilisation ha provided a sat i fying opportunity for personal development , not 
only in Ole pur uit of truth, but also in pr viding outlets for activities which 
supply all the values which religion was accustomed to provide . . . Our 
problem is to find how Christianity can baptise the new learning and the new 
social order with the spirit of Christ ... " 
On tile other hand , Rufus M. Jones In a leading paper on "Secular 
Civilisation and the Christian Task" , defined secularism as " a way of life and 
an interpretation of life ilial include only the natural order of things and that do 
not find God, or a realm of spiritual reality essential for life and thought. ' and 
declared it' a rival movement a powerful, as dangerous , as insidious a any of 
the great historical heresies." 
From this brief survey we can see how it was almost inevitable that divergent 
theories of secularism should develop in the cour e of modern westem history 
and that one should find a fundamental ambivalence in the contemporary 
intellectual stance of secularism. 
Theories of secularism can be analysed in terms of three concepts: 
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contemporaneity, co-exi tence and autonomy. To these roughly correspond (a) 
the theotogical, (b) the political a.nd (c) the economic-philosophic (or Marxian) 
levels and contexts of interpretation. It is not suggested that these represent 
three distinct and precise meanings or mutually exclusive contexts. This 
conceptual distinction is simply an exegetical tool. In fact today the different 
meanings, uses and contexts of 'secularism' overlap and interpenetrate most of 
the time. And hence it is very difficult to avoid mixing up various meanings of 
the term. 
The following analysis of the idea of Secularism in terms of the concepts of 
contemporaneity, coexistence and autonomy seeks to show that even in the 
midst of variety and confusion of meanings of secularism, there is one that 
remains central. 
The term 'secular', as already indicated, is derived from the Latin saeculum' 
which means 'an age, an indefinite period of time or the present age.' To be 
secular would thu mean to be concerned with one's age or time, and, by 
extension, it will stand for interest and involvement In this-worldly affairs. 
Thus secularism will be contradistinguished from non-temporal, eternal, 
supennundane or other-worldly interests and affairs. Hence the secular' has 
often been opposed to the religious or sacred, having from this point of view, 
mainly a negative value. "Secularisation, once branded the enemy, has 
suddenly become the darling of recent Protestant theology and there are strong 
indications that the more progressive Catholic theologians are softening ... We 
now have serious and respected theologians, such as Van Buren, who expounds 
t11e 'secular meaning of the Gospel", and Altizer who proclaims "the death of 
God" and propagates "Christian At11eism". 
This fundamental shift in the understanding of secularism has taken place 
through an emphasis on the centrality of history ("God acts in history '): 
secularism has sometimes been defined as "the historicization of man's 
existence ; also through a desire to give to religion and church a contemporary 
relevance. One can see this clearly prefigured in Holyoake. Secular 
theologians feel deeply concerned about making religion (Church) individually 
and socially relevant and significant to the industrial-technological man. 
In tead of the conventional exclusion of secular (temporal , worldly) concerns 
from the religious life of man and the consequent indifference of the Church to 
it, the secular theologians want the Church to be wiili man in all the spheres of 
his life and t11us be at one wiili the Lime (instead of being at odds wit11 it). He. 
therefore, strives for a reinterpretation of the Christian tradition which will be 
consistent with scientific knowledge and the consciousness of ' modern man' . In 
practical application, therefore, theological secularism is largely a matter of 
ecclesiastical reorientation and reform. Theoretically, though this is scarcely 
acknowledged - it implies a resacralization of the secular even though it 
begins with demythologization and desacralization. Indeed, at the highest level, 
its logic tends to the identity of the sacred and the secular. 
Whether one looks upon secular theology as an attempt to reactivate religion 
by giving it a total, contemporary meaning, or as a movement away from true 
religion by reducing it to modern (as distinguished from traditional) 
anthropology, it is a radical interpretation of secularism. In contrast, there js 
the approach in terms of co-existence of the Religious and t11e Non-religious. In 
this interpretation secularism mediates between religion on the one hand and 
politics and education (and culture) on the other. SecuJarisation is then seen as 
essentially the process by which the nature and spheres of politics and 
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education (and culture) are separated from religion and are thus defined and 
delimited in relation to it. Each sphere can then function freely without 
interference from Religion. It is also to be noted that though E ducation and 
Culture are separated from Religion, they are both dominated by Politics. This 
is basically a political use of the concept of secularism since it is based on the 
separation and balance of powers. Tltis is true whether the relation between the 
Church and the State is hierarchical or coordinate. The concept of the secular 
state belongs here. It may refer to a state that is non-religious in nature with its 
a'Uthority limited to non- religious matters; or given a situation of religious 
plurality and socio-cultural heterogeneity. a state that is neutral and impartial 
in all religious, cultural and educational matters. ln the latter case, the state can 
hardly be called secular in any specific sense of t11e term. It may also be pointed out 
that a religiously neutral state and one t11at is impartial towards different religions 
are logially quite different. Sociological theories of secularisation which treat it 
as an aspect of increasing differentiation of the social system or those which 
interpret secularism in terms of open vs closed social systems, also belong 
here. Basic to this whole approach are two ideas: one, that the religious can be 
effectively isolated from all other spheres of social life, and two that religion 
can be a wholly private aff:lir of the individual. The first is highly doubtful. To 
separate the religious from the social and the public is, in effect, to reduce it to 
a residual category after the social and the public have been defined 
independently of religion. The idea that religion is a wholly private affair of U1e 
individual is only a positive form of this negative result. 
The third use of the concept of secularism is again radical. Thi use clearly 
involves the rejection of the sacred, mythological transcendent world-view and 
an hierarchical social system and substitutes for it the promise of a fully 
scientific, humanistic empirical, relativistic, immanentistic, evolutionary 
world-view; and an "open' "egalitarian' social system. On this view of 
secularism, the ultimate basis of all authority is historical and "rational ' , not 
transcendent, divine or mystical. It proclaims tl1e autonomy and centrality of 
man (of homo faber, not homo religiosus). In modem times the most 
systematic, thorough-going and powerful fonnulation of secularism in this 
sense is to be found in Marx. All modern philosophy that is not grounded in 
metaphysics (properly so-called) or in a Revelation has a fundamental kinship 
with Marx. 
The difference between this and the theological ·theory of secularism arises 
from the ambiguity of the latter. Contemporaneity means looking at lime in 
terms of eternity, but it could also mean looking at eternity in tenns of time. 
Since the concept of contemporaneity seeks to abolish or transcend the 
dichotomy of time and eternity, it posits an equational relation between the 
two. An equation is the temporal expression of an a temporal identity and hence 
is always inherently ambiguous, that is, i.t can always be interpreted from the 
reverse side. 
If the religious (sacred)-secular dichotomy is maintained, the third is the 
fundamental meaning of secularism: all the other meanings that have been 
mentioned here either presuppose it or logically lead to it. More specifically, 
the second interpretation (co-existence) cannot be maintained without an 
eventual acceptance of the third (autonomy) interpretation. 
It may be useful at this point to recapitulate the argument. Firstly, the 
dichotomy of the sacred-profane or religious-secular, is itself the essence of 
secularism; for so long as the superordination of the sacred and the religious is 
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maintained, the reality of the profane, the secular, is subsumed under the 
higher reality of the sacred and the religious. So the dichotomy can be tenable 
only if and when this superordination is rejected which one would not be 
justified in doing unless the higher reality of the sacred and the religious were 
also to be denied. Logically this leaves us with the religious and the secular 
(non-religious) as two coordinate spheres. But there are other implications. To 
make the higher coordinate with what has been lower is to demote the higher 
and promote the lower. Also it changes fundamentally the nature of the 
religious. So it becomes necessary to redefine religion in consonance with the 
new status of the secular and this already implies the superordination of the 
secular. Sociologically different spheres cannot coexist coordinately (which 
implies the internal autonomy of each) unless each is subordinate to a common 
sovereign principle and authority. Since such a principle and authority are not 
posited in the Co-existence Theory of Secularism, religion has to be socially 
subordinate to the secular authority and its autonomy can be preserved, if at 
all, in the strictly private world of the individual, if there be such a world. 
The Contemporaneity Theory of secularism suffers from a fundamental 
ambiguity built into it by the paradox of the equational relation between 
eternity and time. This inherent ambiguity of secularism really cuts our 
distinction between contemporaneity and autonomy, for now autonomy itself 
can be one of the two modes of interpreting and understanding the concept of 
contemporaneity as a theory of secularism. The most crucial issue with regard 
to man's religious life today is, therefore, between these two alternative 
interpretations. They may be called the autonomous humanistic and the 
transcendent-radical interpretations of secularism. 
The autonomous-humanist interpretation has two main forms: the Marxist 
and the Liberal. Marxism declares the greater glory of man as the goal of 
human history and is based on the promise of the eventual disappearance of 
religion not only in its hitherto mainfested forms but also in other future forms 
like the religion of humanity or scientific religion. To hold that Marxism or 
Communism itself is a new religion is not really helpful or relevant in this 
context because either it is a disguised criticism of Marxism-Communism, in 
which case it has no positive relevance, or it implies a subsumption of religion 
and non-religion under a single unnamed category and this would be quite 
unwarranted, unless such a category is specified and shown to be logically 
tenable. 
For want of space this form of autonomous secularism cannot be 
discussed here. Let us, therefore pass on to the Liberal form of autonomous 
Secularism which, again, has two chief variants and examine the other two 
forms and examine them briefly. One of them has been called Civil Religion of 
which Robert Bellah has recently given a systematic exposition. The other is 
called the Neo-episodic Theory of Progress; Ernest Gellner is its proponent. 
There is an essential kinship between the two, though they look quite different 
from each other. 
The following paragraphs summarise Robert Bellah's theory of Civil 
Religion in America: 
There seems little doubt that a successful negotiation of this third time of 
trial - the attainment of some kind of viable and coherent world-order -
would precipitate a major new set of symbolic forms. So far the flickering 
flame of the United Nations bums too low to be the focus of a cult, but the 
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emergence of a genuine trans-national sovereignty would certainly change 
this. It would necessitate the incorporation of vital international symbolism 
into our civil religion, or, perhaps a better way of putting it, it would result in 
American civil religion becoming simply one part of a new civil religion 
might take, though il obvi usly would draw on religious traditions beyond 
the sphere of Biblical religion alone. Fortunately. since tho American civil 
religion is not the worship of the American nation but an UJlderstanding of 
the American experience in the light of ultimate and universal reality, the 
reorganisation entailed by such a new situation need not disrupt the 
American civil religion' s continuity. A world civil religion could be 
accepted as a fulfilment and not a denial of American civil religion. Indeed 
uch an outcome has been the eschatological hope of American civil 
religion from the beginning. To deny such an outcome would be to deny the 
meaning of America itself. 
Behind the civil religion at every point lie Biblical archetypes: Exodus, 
Chosen People, Promised Land, New Jerusalem, Sacrificial Dea.th and 
Rebirth. But is is at o genuinely American and genuinely new. It has its own 
sacred events and sacred places, its own solemn rituals and symbols. It is 
concerned that America be a society as perfectly in accord wilb the wiU of 
God as men can make it and a light to all the nations.2 
The otber fonn of the humanist autonomous secularism- the nco-Episodic 
Theory of Progress - is summarised in the following quotation from Ernest 
GeJJner. 
Progress lhe.ories can be ubdivided into three species: the Episodic· the 
Evolutionist; and the nco-Episodic. These are the distinctions we need, and 
this also is roughly the order in which these species of the theory appeared 
on the scene . . . 
This then in the third the 'nco-Episodic way of conceiving progress, and 
the one which now effectively underlies social thought It has various, and 
to my mind, decisive advantages over the previous two kinds, the (odd) 
episodic and the global-entelechy types - including, incidentally, the 
advantage of being concerned witb something that really happens, and the 
advantage of already in fact pervading the contemporary social 
consciousness. It has the advantage over the entelechy stories, that it is 
concerned with a concrete episode, however, large, rather than with the 
totality of things. But at the same time the nee-episodic outlook takes note 
of - indeed, it concentrates on - those very facts which bad, above all 
others inspired Evolutionism· the sense and perception of rapid, cumulative 
change, somehow pointing or seeming to point in some one direction. Those 
very changes which originally suggested Evolutionism which was indeed an 
extrapolation from them are the very stuff of that crucial Episode which, on 
the present argument, is t.he very proper starting point of social thought· 
thus, in a way, they are now elevated to an even higher dignity than they 
enjoyed within tbe Evolutionist scheme.3 
It would be undoubtedly interesting and useful to analyse both these 
developments of secularism as associated with Bellah and Gellner as they 
impinge on the religious situation in the contemporary world but this has to 
await some other opportunity. Our purpose here is to underline some of the 
major points of Bellah and Gellner and to show their kinship as secular 
universalists. 
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Bellah s theory of civil religion centres religion first in American history, and 
then by the same process extends it to world-history. The history of civil 
religion and according to this theory, of all future religion, thus becomes 
coextensive with the history of America in the world. The religiousness of all 
oU1er peoples in the world - followers of different traditions - thus becomes 
automatically involved in indeed a part of the American role and destiny in 
world-history. 
The basis of this new unified world-religion would, according to Bellah, be 
twofold: 
(a) Faith in a supranational reality of power. 
(b) A symbol-system that would presumably be an interpretation of this 
supranational reality and would evolve synthetically or eclectically from 
the ymbol-system of U1e existing world religions - just as the symbol-
system of the present American civil religion has been derived from the 
J udaeo-Christian tradition. 
Let me now point out the close relationship that exi ts between Bellah's 
Theory of Civil Rcligi.on and Gellner's nco-Episodic Theory of Progress (and 
its corollary, Tran itionalism). 
In order to bring out the clo e kinship between the two, let me note, in a 
summary form. some of their mo t important differences and simi larities. 
1. Unlike Bellah, Gellner proposes his nco-Episodic Progressism and the 
ideology of Tran itiona li sm derived from it, not as a new religion but as a 
philosophy in terms of whkh religion implicitly becomes ob olete. 
2. Accordingly, unlike Civil Religion Gellner's position is immanentist and 
has a positive orientation to time. It does not explicitly bring in any 
transtemporal dimension. It tries to by-pass {though not very uccessfully) the 
problem of eschatology, which , thr ugh Chri tianity, ha been one of the 
sources of the idea of meaning in human history. And yet, like the theory of 
Civil Religion. it is both hi t rica! and contemporary. This it achieves through 
making the concept f Transiti n central. 
On the ther hand , we may also note two basic similarities between the 
theories of Bellah and Gellner: 
I. B th have a world-historical {global) orientation which disregards the 
existing traditional religion of the world. 
2. Both pr vide a basis for making all religions - natural , supernatural , 
mystical, tran ·cendental, metaphysical , exi tential, pr phetic, revelat ry -
marginal to man· life. At the same time. both attempt t establish a non-
religi us world-hi torical task as the telo f man· highc ·t life. ( In Bellah. the 
problem is to attain 'some kind of iable and coherent world-order': in Gellner 
it i the 'difTusi n of industrializa tion carried out by national units'.) In this 
sense both Civil Religion and nco-Episodic Progressism are based on a secular 
eschatology. 
Thus ne can sec Gellner' s theory as a generali7.ation of Bellah's idea which 
can serve as the philos phical basi of ivil Religion. 
This is the stage. I think. t rene t on the nature of the two de\<el pmcnts of 
seculari m in re lati n to religi n today. If rene ti ns prove t be ound. 
lhcy will significantly bear on that other dcvcl pmcnt r ecularity. which a 
little earlier we indicated as a radical movement in terms of c ntcmporancity 
and which. I tried to . ho \ . is reall am vc 1 \ ard a renewal fman· religious 
lilc. 
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With relerence to Gellner's theory a general theoretical observation may be 
in order here. The three species into which Gellner with great penetration 
analyses Ute modern Progress Theory can be further seen as pseudo-
creationist pseudo-metaphysical and pseudo-Christian. Episodic theories of 
Progress are centred in a postulated protohistorioal Event which can be seen as 
the historicization of the archetype of God's creation of the world ex nihilo. 
The Evolutionist theories are process centred. Here an historicization of 
cosmological myths is involved. The nco-Episodic tlteory of progress is 
oriented not to the origin of the universe but to the history of the world. This 
theory can be seen as the secularisation of the Advent and the Christian 
Kerygma. 
In introducing the idea of traditional myths and archetypes, there is no 
intention to suggest a:n analogical correspondence between these archetypes 
and modern theories of Progress. The point rather is to show that the latter are 
profanations of the corresponding archetypes. (Perhaps Gellner himself is 
aware of tltese implicit parallelisms, though obviously he does not wish to 
suggest it. His view of Progress as a secular salvation is a good indication of his 
thinking in Utis direction.) 
Apart from the excellent reasons given by Gellner for the failure of the 
Episodic and Evolutionist tlteories one may also remark tltat the episodic 
theories of progress are too close to creationism, for in Europe' s flight from the 
traditional religious world-view, it would quickly yield place to the evolutionist 
theory which is in fact wholly anti-creationist. However, its structure is 
ahistorical and apolitical, and hence by itself it is not quite consonant with tl1e 
newly emerging scientific secular world-view. Hence evolutionism has to be 
conjoined with the idea of natural progress ( the upward slope" in Gellner's 
illuminating phrase) to bold a difficult balance between the eschatological 
ethos and the Promethean of modern European Civilization. 
It is this tension within the evolutionist idea of Progress ilial gives rise to the 
nco-Episodic theory of Progress which tries to overcome it by its Promethean 
elan - a secularization of the Advent and the Kerygmatic dimension of 
Christianity. This must be remembered when one looks at the continued and 
nearly global success of the 'nco-Episodic theory of Progress"; first as post-
mediaeval imperialism and now as modernization. 
This geneological ideography is intended as a footnote towards 
understanding the extraordinary strength of the secular idea in the form of 
recent theories of imperialism and modernization. ft should be clear, however, 
that these analytical parallelisms have no important bearing either on the 
merit of the three theories of Progressism or on the truth of what have been 
seen here as their archetypes. 
Coming to specific reflections, the first observation to make particularly for 
an Asian is that both these developments involve a vision of world-secularism 
which renders the history and nature of other religions like Hinduism, 
Buddhism and Islam completely subordinate to the history of modern Euro-
American civilisation. The most crucial poin,t is that the history here in 
question is not the history of tlte religiousness of the West. The history to 
which the theories of Civil Religion and nco-Episodic Evolutionism 
subordinate the religions and the histories of tlte non-Western peoples is the 
history of tecJmology and, at best, the history of the liberal-humanist 
"ideology". It is certainly not the history of Christianity, or Judaism which 
have been the dominant religions of the West so far. From this point of view 
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the other form in which secular Christianity has been interpreted today, viz. the 
theory represented among others by Van Leeuwen4 (which I did not have time 
to discuss even briefly) is not such a fundamental challenge to the religiousness 
of contemporary man, particularly in Asia and Africa - because, in this 
interpretation of modem secularism, technology and the present dominant role 
of western history is interpreted as basically a development from within 
Christianity. And even though the future history of the world is conceived in 
terms of the Christianization of the non-Western world, the terms of 
interpretation, the vision itself, is still religious, whatever the interpretation. 
However, the fundamental weakness of this and all such theories, at least from 
a non-Westener's point of view, is that the idea of human unity, which can be 
meaningful only at the transcendent, transtemporal level, is interpreted at a 
concrete historic level, at which level it is indistinguishable from universal 
domination of one group (over the rest). In other words, the idea of a world-
religion implied in Van Leeuwen's theory of Christian history compromises the 
transcendent basis of religion. It seems to me that secularism has somehow got 
built into his interpretation of the history of Christianity. If this be so, though 
perhaps I misunderstand him here, it reveals an internal threat to the 
religiousness of man both in the Christian and non-Christian world. 
To come back to our two forms of secularism, namely, Bellah's Civil 
Religion and Gellner's neo-Episodic theory of Progress, we may now point out 
the internal connection between the two in the context of similarities and 
dissimilarities we indicated a little while ago. In order that the theory of history 
implicit in Bellah's views may be generalised, it is necessary to provide a basis 
for the American Destiny in terms of which the whole theory of Civil Religion 
is constructed. And this will involve explaining away traditional religions, for 
otherwise a specific segment of human history cannot be put in the centre of 
universal history without bringing in a theology of history which the theory of 
Civil Religion really fights shy of. The evolutionary theory does this task. 
What the evolutionary theory of religion really implies is that either a sociology 
or a philosophy of history can replace religion; and this, consistently followed 
through, leads one to a position similar to that of Marx. The task of the 
sociology of religion, as it has been developed in the West, is to maintain the 
dividing line between Marxism and Humanism, thus guarding against a total 
loss of Christianity or of any traditional religion which Marxism involves. Thus 
if this depth-analysis is at all sound, a most insidiously dangerous form of 
secularism in relation to contemporary man's religiousness is the development 
of a sociology of religion. 
What basis do I have for being as critical as I have been throughout of the 
autonomous, immanentist-humanist concept of man's history? It is a large and 
fundamental question and requires a whole paper to itself. Here, I can deal 
with it only very briefly. The acceptance or rejection of such a world-view 
depends, in the last analysis, on the presupposed concept of Man. 
Actually the phrase 'concept of man' is misleading. Only if it were possible 
to conceptualise man, would it be a legitimate question whether it is homo 
religiosus, homo faber, or a social/political/historical man which constitutes 
the true concept of man. But man cannot be conceptualised because all 
conceptions come from him and he cannot be subordinated to his own 
conceptualising power, however high it may rank among his other powers. The 
question, "Who am 1?", is the only way to put the question of man's identity, 
for man cannot be objectified or conceptualised. The very form of this question 
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reveals both our infinitude and our finitude; for it is one of the paradoxical 
questions which must be asked but cannot be answered. The mediator between 
the grandeur and the misery of man, between his infinitude and his finitude is 
Tradition in its twin modes: the Transcendent-Spiritual, and the Religio-
Historical. This is why neither a Nation-State nor a World-State nor World-
History, nothing temporal nothing that is in principle finite, can be the essence 
of man's re ligiousness. Nor, for the same reason, can reli gion be reduced to 
Anthropology or Sociology; for, to do so would be to eliminate the infinitude of 
man revealed by ,the syntax of the question, 'Who am I?" Since hope is the 
temporal expression of thi s infinitude the future of contemporary man's 
religiousness in the face of orne of the ml\jor forms of secularity that have 
been indicated here lies ultimately only in the hope of a renewal of 
metaphysics (Sophia Perennis et Universalis, Transcendent Wisdom), of 
which theology, anthropology and sociology will be the expressions at 
appropriate levels and in diverse modes. 
III 
This brief survey of the meanings and forms of secularism has endeavoured 
to how that autonomous humanism which in the las t analysis puts man in the 
centre of the universe and makes him the telos of history is the central and, so 
to say, the inevitable meaning of secularism· and that Gellne r's nco-Episodic 
Theory of Progress represents a highly sophisticated form of secularism that is 
most destructive of all religious traditions. We have tried to show that the co-
existence theory of secularism is logically untenable for it already involves a 
non-traditional definition of religions and, moreover, in practice it necessarily 
leads to one or the other form of autonomous humanism. This is also true of a 
form of secularism which India is supposed to have adopted. It is often called 
sarva dharma samabhiiva, that is, equivalence of all religions and the State 
not recognizing the pre-eminence of any one religion. It is to be mentioned here 
that until the constitutional amendment of 1976 which was made during the 
emergency period India had not been constitut ionally proclaimed a Secular 
State though there have been, from the very beginning, a number of 
constitutional provisions and other legislative measures in the direction of 
secularism. Both jurists and social scientists have been divided on the precise 
nature of the Indian State with reference to secularism. This controversy has 
of course, ended now with the inclusion of the word 'secular' in the Indian 
Constitution; no definition of the term has, however, been provided in the 
Constitution: sarva dharma samabhiiva is not the constitutional definition of 
Indian secularism, though it does represent the most widely accepted view in 
political circles and is also favoured by leading and influential social scientists. 
It is not proposed to examine here this Indian version of the co-existence theory 
of secularism. It should be sufficient to remark that equivalence or equality of 
diverse religions traditions can mean merely a legally and politically postulated 
equality and hence necessarily limited to a circumscribed domain. F rom the 
standpoint of the religious traditions themselves, this equivalence or equality of 
religions must appear as a legal and political fiction, an "as if'. Any such 
political stance can be very damaging to their inner vitality. If, however, an 
attempt was somehow made to go deeper into this idea of san1a dharma 
samabhli.va, it would lead one to the transcendental (metaphysical) unity of all 
religions. This meaning is, however, wholly incompatible with secularism in 
any form, and, appearances to the contrary, radically in conflict with any 
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public policy that requires equal support to social expressions of all kinds of 
religions and indifference to religion as such. 
In fact it is the loss of the esoteric and metaphysical level of religions that 
might have been a mlljor factor in their decay through sectarianism and 
eventua l emergence of the secular (non-religious) world-view. This brings us 
once again ta the contemporaneity theory of secularism and the notion of 
"secular theology' . lt has already been pointed out how the paradoxical notion 
of a secular theology is founded on the notion of contemporareity and, we have 
also argued tl1at it is inherently ambiguous. In concluding this essay a brief 
elucidation of this point may be in order. 
Concern wiU1 ilie eternal destiny of man shou ld be via his life in time: this is 
the central idea of secular theology. From this perfectly sound idea, it does not 
follow that eternal truths should be adjusted to changing notions of a given age. 
It does not follow that the modem man is the measure of all things (to do so is 
not an application but a perversion of Protagoras profound truth). Eternity is 
that Now to which the past and future are ever present; and iliis means Ulat the 
" intrinsic nature of tl1e Self is its present contemporaneity with whatever has 
been or will be".s It follows that our age has to be viewed under the aspect of 
eternity, ilien alone can we be contemporaneous with il 
The authentic idea of contemporaneity is related to human destiny in 
eternity, not to man s fate in each age. St. Thomas Aquinas says: "Fate lies iu 
the created causes them elves. ' (Summa theologica, l. 1 16.2). "The 
deduction, comments Coomaraswamy, "will naturally follow U1al, to escape 
fToJn fate, to be free which is to fulfill one's destiny (reach one's destination, 
man's last end), one must have 'denied himself and passed over from 
becoming to being."6 
To make Christianity or Hinduism or any traditional religion, contemporary, 
' living", "engaged" 'forward-looking'' , 'open etc., means essentially to 
make it once again a "freedom-giving" a " liberating force". And freedom 
really means the possibility that man can escape iliis fate and realize his 
destiny. To interpret Sophia Perennis as embodied in the Christian tradition in 
aqcordance with the notions of mode.m man (science and technology) to seek 
for a secular meaning of tile Gospel, is precisely to be fatalistic and implies a 
decision to be less than human insofar as one does not fulfill one s destiny in 
Eternity. In other words this elevation of one's temporal fate to one s ultimate 
destiny signifies precisely the loss of human freedom and dignity. For freedom 
lies in transcending fate and dignity in striving to be what one is, U1at is, 
realizing one's ultimate destiny. 
Secular and Radical (Death of God) theologies are not as fashionable today 
as they were a decade or so ago. But the kind of intellectual response to the 
challenge of modernism they represent is not yet obsolete. Of course there are 
many strands in what may be broadly called secular theology. (In fact. it is 
often too broad a label.) There are elements in different schools of secular and 
radical theology which are true to the Christian tradition while giving us a 
contemporary formulation. It is our task to distinguish such formulations 
carefully and systematically from those tllat, in effect, seek to "modernize" 
traditional Christian ideas and principles. 
Perhaps it is these modernizations of Sophia Perennis U1at are most dangerous· 
for they are the enemy within. Secular and radical theologies are close aUies of 
Gellner's nco-Episodic theory of Progress. As we have already pointed out the 
acceptance of th.is 'modem" theory of Progress which claims to be at once 
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philosophical and scientific-technological, would mean the elimination of all 
religious traditions. 
We have already argued that Gellner's theory represents in many ways the 
most sophisticated twist that could be given to secularism. There does remain 
perhaps a redeeming feature: the ironical stance implicit in Gellner's theory. In 
propounding his transitionalism - elevating "transition" to the position of an 
'ism' (in itself a staggering idea), Gellner says: "It is useless to seek a 
foundation (for our morals) in the axioms ofbeetlehood or manhood for we are 
no longer beetles, and the nature of manhood happily is not rigidly 
determined."? The sentence is superb in the depth of its irony and one is 
irresistibly reminded of Kafka's Metamorphosis. Secular and radical 
theologies which seek Eternity by modernizing it are founded on the belief that 
the nature of man is not "rigidly determined", forgetting that in that case there 
can be no eternal destiny for man. Unlike the social scientist, however, the 
secular theologian cannot deny the idea of man's destiny, for he cannot spare 
the former's belief that the transition to industrialism is itself the ultimate 
destiny for contemporary man. Nor perhaps can he agree with Paul Valery: 
"Once destiny was an honest game of cards which followed certain 
conventions, with a limited number of cards and values. Now the player 
realizes in amazement that the hand of his future contains cards never seen 
before and the rules of the game are modified by each play." If he agreed with 
such a view on its own terms, the theologian would discover before long that he 
had to deny eternity and abandon all theology, secular or otherwise. Secular 
and radical theologies that seek contemporaneity via "modernization" of the 
First Principles and the core myths thus represent secularisms in its most 
insidious form. 
Those who believe in the eternal destiny of man and the saving power of the 
religious traditions have a twofold task today. Firstly, they have to identify and 
resist the myriad manifestations of the kind of mentality which is centred in the 
irreversibility (and irresistibility) of modernism and finds expression in such 
theories as neo-episodism and secular theology. Secondly, they have to show 
that to be contemporary, a religious tradition needs to be renewed not 
"modernised", and that this renewal means recovery of roots and restoration to 
wholeness. Man to-day stands in supreme need of Repentance, a radical 
transformation of awareness. It is only with metanoia that previously 
"inoperative causes are brought into play, with new results."8 
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